And justice for whom?  by Wells, Winfield J.
For physicians, medical malpractice also means they
must maintain costly liability insurance that is out of
proportion to that of any other profession. This egre-
gious expense is primarily needed to protect against
unjustified claims resulting from recognized complica-
tions of treating difficult illnesses. The root of the prob-
lem is the legal morass that includes an overabundance
of attorneys looking for any opportunity to make a buck
and an out-of-control civil justice system that allows the
pursuit of unmerited allegations. The pinnacle of the
absurd is reached if a case ends up in civil court. Here,
juries who are not prepared to make judgments about
scientifically and technically complex issues are sub-
jected to days of theater in which the attorney with the
best acting skills is likely to prevail. This occasionally
culminates in an overinflated multi-million dollar
award, much of which is granted for noneconomic loss-
es such as pain, suffering, and loss of consortium.
Finally, defensive medicine, a by-product of the threat
of malpractice liability, wastes valuable resources to
ensure one’s backside is covered. The cost of this prac-
tice may be substantial.
Patients’ perspective. Patients’ views of the medical
liability system differ considerably from those of the
physician. What if a patient is injured while undergoing
medical treatment and the injury was the result of a mis-
take? In such a case, a malpractice claim may be the
only way the patient can recoup damages for the injury.
I t would be difficult to find anyone who is satisfiedwith the current system of resolving medical liability
disputes. In approaching this subject, I have first tried to
look at the issues from the perspective of each of the
major constituents.
Perspectives on medical liability
Physicians’ perspective. Physicians take an allegation
of malpractice as a personal affront to their profession-
alism. It is an attack on their character and dedication, as
well as their skill. A claim becomes an emotionally
exhausting event for many doctors, and they may end up
obsessed with defending their honor. At the extreme,
competent doctors have decided to “hang it up” rather
than continue their practice in an environment that
would allow such an unfair event to occur.
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Funds may be needed to aid in the patient’s recovery or,
in the case of a permanent disability, for long-term
care. There is also the issue of lost earnings.
Most patients who file a malpractice claim are angry
and want to see their doctors punished for the uncaring,
incompetent, and potentially dangerous individuals that
they are. By suing, they may prevent the same thing from
happening to others. The system is a way of getting bad
doctors out in the open to be judged and “found out.”
While not an enjoyable process, somebody has to do it
because the medical profession does a very poor job of
policing itself. There is a widely held perception that
physicians will not say anything negative about other
physicians, particularly if there are potential liability
issues involved. This “code of silence” necessitates the
need for clever attorneys who can find the truth.
The legal perspective. Attorneys and the civil justice
system look at medical malpractice in the same way
they do any other situation in which a person is injured.
That person may be entitled to damages. Why should
the health care system be treated differently from oth-
ers? Society had established rules and a method for
deciding whether there is fault and how much payment
should be made if a person is injured as a result of neg-
ligence. The civil justice system may be imperfect, but
no one has put forward an alternative that “the people”
believe would be more fair.
The legal perspective might also propose that the
malpractice system helps to curtail bad care by high-
lighting incompetence. The threat of liability helps
keep physicians and the system on its toes, and danger-
ous practice is quickly corrected.
Attorneys could point out that contrary to what physi-
cians and the health care industry might lead the public to
believe, the number of malpractice claims is not exces-
sive. In fact, many more people are entitled to compensa-
tion than ever receive it. The primary platform for this
argument comes from two widely quoted reports from
the Harvard School of Public Health1,2 that looked at
malpractice claims and adverse events due to negligence.
These retrospective reviews of randomly selected records
of hospitalized patients from the state of New York ini-
tially screened more than 30,000 charts, and nearly 8000
were referred to a physician panel for review. From these
charts 1100 adverse events were identified. These repre-
sented injuries resulting from the patient’s medical care
rather than from the primary illness. Among these
adverse events, 280 were deemed to be due to negligence.
By extrapolation, the authors concluded that about 1% of
hospitalized patients had an adverse event resulting from
negligence. During the same time period, the number of
claims generated per hospital discharge was calculated to
be 0.13%. Among the 280 study cases in which negli-
gence was suspected, only 8 claims were actually filed
(2.8% of potential claims). Not surprisingly, the authors
of this study concluded that medical malpractice litiga-
tion infrequently compensated patients injured by negli-
gence and rarely identified and held providers account-
able for substandard care.
Overview of medical malpractice involving
cardiothoracic surgeons 
Little information exists on the number of malprac-
tice claims filed against cardiothoracic surgeons, the
nature and outcome of such cases, and the costs
involved. While I was serving as chair of medical-legal
affairs for The Society of Thoracic Surgeons (STS), our
committee established a relationship with the Physician
Insurers Association of America (PIAA). PIAA is a
trade association of physician-owned and -operated
medical malpractice insurance companies that has been
collecting data on malpractice claims since 1985. The
PIAA membership includes more than 60 carriers rep-
resenting about 240,000 private practicing physicians
in the United States and almost 500,000 practitioners
abroad. There are currently more than 140,000 closed
claims from the United States in the ongoing database,
of which 3800 are attributed to cardiothoracic sur-
geons. The analysis described in this section comes
from a review of these 3800 cases. The PIAA research
department estimates that the data-sharing project cap-
tures approximately 25% of the claims against privately
practicing physicians in the United States.
Malpractice claims against cardiothoracic sur-
geons. Cardiothoracic surgeons account for about 3%
of the malpractice claims in the PIAA closed case file.
They are responsible for a relatively smaller percent-
age, 2.2%, of all indemnity payments.
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Fig 1. Natural history of malpractice claims against cardio-
thoracic surgeons, based on approximately 3800 closed
claims in the PIAA database (1985-1997).
Natural history of malpractice claims against car-
diothoracic surgeons. The outcome of the 3800 closed
claims against cardiothoracic surgeons documented in
the PIAA database between 1985 and 1997 has been
reviewed. For the purposes of this analysis, there are
three potential outcomes: (1) A claim is abandoned,
withdrawn, or dismissed (subsequently to be labeled as
dismissed); (2) the claim is settled before a verdict at
trial; or (3) the claim is resolved by a jury verdict. A
few cases were resolved by arbitration, but the numbers
were too small for a meaningful analysis.
Using the three criteria for outcome, 70% of the
claims analyzed were dismissed, 23% were settled, and
only 7% were resolved by a verdict at trial (Fig 1).
Further, the percentage of claims that were resolved
with compensation to the plaintiff over the period
1985-1997 showed no significant trend in either direc-
tion over time, with approximately 25% requiring pay-
ment. This outcome is similar to the results for the
overall universe of all subspecialties covered by the
PIAA data wherein 68% of claims are dismissed. 
Expenditures associated with various outcomes of
claims against cardiothoracic surgeons. In general,
the expenditures related to a claim have been separated
into the dollars spent on managing the defense (ie,
attorneys’ fees, fees for expert reviews, fees for deposi-
tions) and, if applicable, the dollars paid in indemnity.
The expenditures for each of the three potential out-
comes have been separately studied, and the trend in
costs over a 10-year time period comparing the years
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Fig 2. Claims that are withdrawn or dismissed (70% of all cases). Average and median expense for defense (in
1998 dollars).
Fig 3. Claims that are settled (23% of all cases). Total costs: expense for defense plus indemnity (all in 1998
dollars).
1985-1987 to the years 1995-1997 have been calculat-
ed. All expenditures have been converted to 1998 dol-
lars by means of a coefficient based on the rate of infla-
tion as measured by the Consumers Price Index.
Expenditures for claims that are dismissed (Fig 2).
Although 70% of claims filed against cardiothoracic
surgeons are eventually abandoned, withdrawn, or dis-
missed, there are still significant expenses incurred for
defense. Among 644 claims that were dismissed in the
time period 1995-1997, the average cost per claim was
$10,664 and the median cost was $3733. Among 544
claims from 1985-1987, the average was $5860 and the
median $2394. All costs have been converted to 1998
dollars. Thus, over a 10-year time period, the average
cost to defend a claim that is eventually dismissed has
risen 82% and the median cost, 56%. These figures do
not account for the substantial time that the accused
surgeon often spends on his or her own defense.
Expenditures for claims that are settled without a
jury verdict (Fig 3). For cases that are settled there are
two sources of cost: the expense of defending the claim
and the indemnity payment for damages. Although the
indemnity portion makes up 85% of the total expendi-
ture, the cost of defense for these claims is much high-
er than for claims that are dismissed. Among 181 claims
that were settled in the period 1995-1997, the average
defense cost was $31,742 and the median was $19,081.
The total cost of these claims was much higher, with the
average among the 181 cases being $242,790, while the
median was $119,970. The difference between the aver-
age and median costs suggests a skew toward several
claims with very high indemnity payments.
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Fig 4. A comparison of expense for defense between cases that are dismissed, settled, or tried. Average and medi-
an for 1995-1997 (all in 1998 dollars).
Fig 5. Indemnity payments. Cases settled versus plaintiff verdict (all in 1998 dollars).
When these 1995-1997 figures are compared with the
costs from 206 cases settled between 1985-1987, a sig-
nificant increase in cost is apparent (even after account-
ing for inflation). Average costs increased 42% overall,
with average defense expenses going up 98% and aver-
age indemnity payments increasing 38%. The same
analysis for median costs showed an 81% increase
overall and 70% and 83% rises for defense and indem-
nity payments, respectively.
Expenditures for claims that result in a jury ver-
dict. This analysis has two arms with one related to
cases in which there is a verdict for the defense and the
other, those in which the plaintiff prevails. Among the
264 cases resolved at trial between 1985 and 1997,
86% resulted in a defense verdict and in 14% the plain-
tiff was awarded damages. As might be expected, the
cost of defending a claim that goes to trial is consider-
ably higher than for cases that are settled. The average
is about twice as much and the median about three
times the cost. Whether the case is defended or lost at
trial, the cost for the defense is about the same. The
average and median costs for defense for claims that
are dismissed, settled, and resolved at trial in the peri-
od 1995-1997 are compared in Fig 4. The high costs of
trial suggest the reason that insurance companies are
often anxious to settle claims quickly for a figure that
approaches the “cost of defense.” This may be the case
even if there is no evidence of practice that is below the
standard. Although convenient and seemingly good
business practice for the carrier, such settlements may
encourage plaintiff’s attorneys to pursue cases involv-
ing a maloccurrence, even if no negligence is apparent,
in hopes of a quick pay day. Insurance companies con-
front a major dilemma in positioning themselves with
such “nuisance suits,” and some have elected to defend
when expert review suggests no breach of the standard
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Fig 6. Conditions leading to claims against cardiothoracic surgeons with the percentage of each category where
indemnity was paid, and the average payment in dollars. CAD, Coronary artery disease.
Fig 7. WTSA malpractice survey: type of coverage.
Table I. Claims involving cardiothoracic surgeons by
misadventure (1985-1997)
Misadventure Percent paid Average 
(n = 3560) Percent to close indemnity
Improper performance 36 28 $174,571
No misadventure 25 6 $197,458
Error in diagnosis 11 27 $161,073
Failure to monitor care 7 30 $181,869
Foreign body 5 45 $30,294
Not indicated 4 31 $164,596
Failure to diagnose 4 28 $182,309
complications
Delay in performance 3 32 $212,209
Not performed 3 35 $183,090
Medication error 2 37 $267,612
of care. Although initially more costly, this strategy
may be more cost effective in the long run.
Finally, there is the matter of indemnity payments for
cases that result in a jury verdict for the plaintiff. The
number of cases available for analysis is relatively small
(n = 37) and the range of awards is large, making it dif-
ficult to assess whether there has been a significant
upward trend in damages over the period 1985-1997.
However, when compared with indemnity payments for
cases that are settled, damages awarded by a jury are two
to three times higher (Fig 5). There may well have been
an attempt to settle these cases, but at a value deemed
inadequate by the plaintiff. It should be remembered that
the plaintiff’s attorney does take a significant risk when
going to trial, since according to the analysis of PIAA
data, the chance of prevailing is only about 15%.
Cardiothoracic surgery versus other subspecial-
ties: Indemnity payments. Overall experience from
1985 to 1997 shows that the average indemnity expen-
diture per file requiring payment was $162,584 for car-
diothoracic surgery claims. Of the 27 specialties recog-
nized by PIAA, cardiothoracic surgery ranked ninth,
with specialties like neurosurgery, obstetrics-gynecolo-
gy, cardiology, and anesthesia being higher. As an
example, the average expenditure per paid file for neu-
rosurgery was about $235,000.
Conditions that result in claims against cardiotho-
racic surgeons. The PIAA database has grouped
claims into general categories by type of disease. Not
surprisingly, the majority of cardiothoracic surgery
claims, 54%, are related to coronary artery disease,
which has been arbitrarily subdivided into coronary
atherosclerosis, acute infarction, and chronic ischemia.
Aortic aneurysm and peripheral vascular problems
comprise other higher incidence conditions. Fig 6 sum-
marizes the information on the conditions that most
often lead to claims, including data on the percentage
of such claims requiring indemnity payment and the
average indemnity paid.
Type of misadventure resulting in claims against
cardiothoracic surgeons. The Data Sharing Project
has also arbitrarily catalogued the nature of the prob-
lems resulting in claims against our specialty. As might
be expected, the most common alleged misadventure
was “improper performance of a procedure,” which
accounted for 35% of closed claims. It is notable that in
25% the insurer could identify “no misadventure,” yet
a few of these cases had to be settled anyway. Table I
tabulates the relative incidence of misadventures and
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Fig 8. WTSA malpractice survey: frequency of suits/years in practice.
Fig 9. WTSA malpractice survey: malpractice claims by type
of care.
reports the percentage of such claims requiring indem-
nity payment, as well as the average cost.
Malpractice experience among members of The
Western Thoracic Surgical Association (WTSA)
With the idea of obtaining a “snapshot” of medical
malpractice in the western part of the United States and
Canada, we have surveyed members of the WTSA to
learn of their experience. Of 384 active and senior
members surveyed, 173 responded (45%). There was
proportionate representation from each of the states
included in the WTSA’s region, although a large num-
ber of the respondents were from California where the
majority of our members practice.
The median respondent to our survey has been in
practice between 20 and 29 years. Although the type of
malpractice coverage spanned the options (as depicted
in Fig 7), a significant number, 28%, were insured
through the institution or university where they were
employed. This is probably an aberration of the acade-
mic skew common to several of our societies. The
median cost of malpractice coverage for all respon-
dents was between $20,000 and $25,000, which
reflects the relatively high proportion of respondents in
academic practice and the fact that the majority were
from California, where tort reform has helped reduce
premiums.
More than 75% of those responding to our survey
had been sued, and the average number of suits per sur-
geon was two. When we compared the average number
of suits with the number of decades in practice (Fig 8),
we found no significant difference except that among
those practicing for 40 years or more, the incidence
was lower. We were unsure whether these more senior
respondents had practiced, at least in part, in a “kinder”
era, or whether they had just forgotten some of their
earlier experience. Fig 9 shows the incidence of mal-
practice claims by type of operation and is roughly pro-
portional to the incidence of cases done in our subspe-
cialty. A further breakdown of claims generated by spe-
cific types of patients in the general thoracic and car-
diovascular categories is seen in Fig 10.
When the outcomes of cases from this WTSA survey
are compared with those reported by the PIAA, which
has a more national scope, the results are less favor-
able. One half of cases reported in the WTSA survey
were dismissed or abandoned, whereas in the PIAA
experience 70% had that outcome. Only 7% of PIAA
cases went to trial, as compared with 17% in the
WTSA experience. It is difficult to know whether this
means that plaintiff’s attorneys in the WTSA region are
more discriminating in selecting cases or more effec-
tive in their pursuit.
The WTSA survey also showed that among 149 cases
that were dismissed, only about one third involved sig-
nificant discovery, suggesting the overall cost for these
claims should have been relatively low. Likewise, in
40% of the cases that were settled, the settlement cost
was less than $30,000, which has traditionally been a
threshold for getting rid of nuisance cases that might
otherwise involve significant defense costs. These find-
ings are shown in Fig 11. Finally, although the number
of cases lost at trial was small (n = 19), only 5 (~25%)
involved payment of more then $250,000. This may be
a reflection of the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (MICRA) tort reform legislation, which
has been in place in California since 1976. Among
other provisions, MICRA limits noneconomic damages
(eg, those for pain, suffering, and loss of consortium) to
a maximum of $250,000.
The expert witness issue 
A surprisingly large number of respondents to the
WTSA survey had served as an expert witness. It could
be argued that the responses were biased toward those
interested in medical-legal issues, but the fact remains
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Fig 10. WTSA malpractice survey: malpractice claims by type of care. CABG, Coronary artery bypass grafting.
that the percentage was high. In an effort to keep the
survey short, we did not get information on how fre-
quently opinions had been given for the defense versus
the plaintiff.
Whereas physicians who read cases for the defense
draw little attention from their colleagues, case review
for a plaintiff’s attorney triggers animosity from one’s
peers. This became acutely apparent to me when, as
chair of medical-legal affairs for the STS, our commit-
tee attempted to establish a national registry of cardio-
thoracic surgery experts. We elicited an amazingly
large response from STS members who were willing to
have their names made available. A preliminary reg-
istry, which was regionalized and categorized by area
of expertise (ie, general thoracic, adult cardiac, con-
genital), was formed. From the outset the committee
believed it was critical that the registry be open to any
attorney, whether representing the defense or the plain-
tiff. The individual registry experts would determine
the acceptability of cases, as well as the fee schedule.
When the proposal to implement the registry was put
before the STS Council, a small but vocal group defeat-
ed the proposal by arguing that allowing plaintiff’s attor-
neys access to registry experts would in essence “aid the
enemy.” This seemed a shortsighted and unfortunate out-
come, because there is no doubt in my mind that there is
more benefit than risk in reviewing cases for the plaintiff.
This opinion is based on several observations:
1. Plaintiff’s attorneys have a difficult time obtaining
qualified experts in cardiothoracic surgery. Because of
the stigmata associated with working for the plaintiff,
there is often difficulty in finding a reputable, experi-
enced, unbiased surgeon to review a matter. Instead, the
plaintiff often ends up with a “hired gun” who finds a
way to support even the weakest argument for practice
below the standard. That is, after all, in the best inter-
est of a professional witness. It is likely that such an
expert encourages the continuation of a legal action
that might otherwise have been turned down had the
plaintiff’s attorney had the benefit of a reputable opin-
ion. This phenomenon may also account for the low
percentage of plaintiff’s verdicts at trial.
2. An experienced plaintiff’s attorney does not want
to pursue a case without merit. If a reputable unbiased
expert reviews a case and finds practice that meets the
standard, the vast majority of skilled plaintiff’s attor-
neys will drop the matter. We know that a very high
percentage of malpractice cases are dismissed, aban-
doned, or withdrawn, and it is highly probable that
such cases might not have been filed had the plaintiff
had access to a reliable expert. It must be conceded that
not all attorneys representing the plaintiff are capable
and experienced, but as a rule the capable attorneys get
the major cases.
3. If a case is below the standard it should be settled
quickly. There is the perception that physicians con-
spire to protect each other under a “code of silence”
even if practice is substandard. This is clearly unac-
ceptable, and we as surgeons must not provide the
ammunition for such an argument by denying plaintiffs
access to experts in our subspecialty. In the majority of
instances in which a case is reviewed by a reputable,
experienced, unbiased expert and care below the stan-
dard is found, settlement discussions begin rapidly.
This is as it should be. Valuable resources should not be
wasted because the plaintiff cannot find a qualified sur-
geon to consider a case.
4. Credibility. Finally, it is difficult to accept a med-
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Fig 11. WTSA malpractice survey: outcome of malpractice claims. 
ical expert as unbiased if he or she has only read cases
for the defense. In sworn testimony all experts will be
asked about their history regarding cases reviewed for
the defense versus the plaintiff. A reasonable balance is
required to be viewed as impartial.
In summary, those involved in medical-legal review
should consider plaintiffs’ cases. This will help to build
the credibility of our profession and on balance be ben-
eficial to our colleagues.
Avoiding malpractice suits. In closing, I would like
to reflect on the issue of avoiding malpractice suits.
The message, like most things that are true, is one that
you have heard repeatedly: develop a close, caring rela-
tionship with your patients. Patients do not sue physi-
cians if they trust them, believe that they care, and
believe that everything possible has been done in their
best interest. Physicians who have avoided lawsuits are
not necessarily the most technically gifted, diagnosti-
cally astute, or even the most respected among their
peers. They are instead the ones who take the extra time
to listen and who organize their practice to show
respect for their patients’ time and dignity. The mani-
festations of such a practice have been articulated by a
group of experienced, suit-free physicians from Texas
who made the following suggestions3:
1. Listen patiently.
2. Respect the patient’s dignity and privacy.
3. Return phone calls promptly.
4. Be polite.
5. Be on time.
6. Have the patient join in decision making.
7. Keep patients’ expectations in line with reality
(prepare them for all eventualities).
8. Be honest about a misadventure (never cover up or
try to blame others).
9. Avoid high-risk situations such as cases you are
not fully equipped to handle or cases in which there is
a personality clash with a patient or family.
10.Treat the patient as you would like to be treated.
We would all be well served to remember and follow
this sage advice.
I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Ms Lori
Bartholomew in collecting and analyzing data from the PIAA
database.
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